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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
VIRGIL LEE WOOD, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
10080 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant Virgil Lee Wood was convicted of grand 
larceny and robbery in the Third District Court, State of 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant Virgil Lee Wood was tried and convicted 
upon jury trial 'Yith his accomplice Robert Colvin. Subse-
quent to conviction, a motion for new trial was filed by 
both defendants. Before the trial court ruled on the motion 
for new trial, the appellant, Virgil Lee Wood, and Robert 
Colvin, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. This court 
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remanded the case for action on the motion for new trial 
and determined that the appeal was premature. State v. 
Wood, 14 U. 2d 192, 381 P. 2d 278 (1963). Subsequently, 
the trial court denied the motion for new trial and Robert 
Colvin appealed separately from the judgment to this court. 
Virgil Lee Wood has appealed and although the brief of 
the appellant purports to cover Robert Colvin, by order of 
the Supreme Court upon motion of the State to dismiss 
appellant Wood's brief, the brief of the appellant Wood 
was limited to himself. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the trial court acted properly 
in denying the appellant's motion for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relevant to the instant appeal are that sub-
sequent to the conviction of the appellant, a motion for 
new trial was filed on behalf of the appellant by appel-
lant's counsel. The part of the motion relevant to this ap-
peal is based upon an affidavit of Mr. Harold C. Brandley 
(R. 6). Mr. Brandley's affidavit was to the effect that 
subsequent to the trial of the appellant, a Mr. Thomas H. 
Sark, who was apparently a juror, told Mr. Brandley that 
the reason he found the appellant Wood guilty was that 
Wood had testified that he did not own a blue jacket, when, 
in fact, Mr. Sark had seen the appellant wearing such a 
jacket in the affiant's office. The trial court denied the 
n1otion for a new trial, apparently rejecting the affidavit 
as providing any basis to impeach the jury's verdict. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ER-
ROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL SINCE THE APPELLANT'S 
MOTION WAS BASED UPON EVIDENCE 
WHICH MAY NOT PROPERLY BE CONSID-
ERED ON A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, AND 
WAS AN ATTEMPT TO IMPEACH THE 
JURY'S VERDICT. 
The sole basis for the appellant's claim before this 
court that the trial court erred in not granting his motion 
for new trial is that the affidavit of a third person, Mr. 
Harold C. Brandley, furnished a basis for requiring a new 
trial. Mr. Brandley was not a juror and the sum and sub~ 
stance of his affidavit merely goes to the reasoning process 
of one of the jurors in the case. 
It is well settled that affidavits which have as their 
effect the impeachment of a jury's verdict may not be con~ 
sidered by the trial court in determining whether or not 
to grant a new trial and that it is improper to allow a 
jury's verdict to be impeached by their own affidavit or 
affidavits of third persons which relate to the deliberation 
processes of the jury. In 24 C. J. S., Criminal Law, Section 
1495, it is stated: 
"Affidavits or testimony of third persons as 
to statements of jurors tending to impeach their 
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verdict are inadmissible, not only as hearsay, but 
also for the same reason which excludes the affi-
davits or testimony of the jurors themselves, the 
admission of an affidavit concerning only hearsay 
statements of a juror would amount to an indirect 
way of permitting a juror to impeach his own ver-
dict.'' 
This proposition of law is generally recognized in previous 
decisions from this court. In People v. Flynn, 7 Utah 378, 
26 Pac. 1114, and People v. Ritchie, 12 Utah 180, 42 Pac. 
209, it was early recognized that an attempt by jurors to 
impeach their own verdicts would not be allowed and that 
affidavits from jurors or third persons which had the 
effect of impeaching the deliberations of the jury could 
not be received in evidence and would not afford a basis 
for the trial court granting a new trial. 
In State v. Rosenberg, 84 Utah 402, 35 P. 2d 1004, a 
motion for new trial was made, supported by the affidavits 
of two jurors that they did not believe that the defendant 
was present at the time of the crime. The trial court de-
nied the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court, in 
affirming the action of the trial court, stated : 
"* * * In denying the motion for a new 
trial, it is not made to appear whether the affi-
davits were stricken or not as being incompetent, 
and, if not stricken, whether the affidavits were 
or were not considered by the court in denying the 
motion for a new trial. The affidavits were in-
competent. The view generally prevails that affi-
davits of jurors cannot be received to show that 
the verdict was the result of a misconception of in-
structions of the court, or of a failure of the jury 
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to correctly comprehend them, or a mistake as to 
the meaning of them, or of the verdict. 16 C. J. 
1238, 1239. The affidavits should have been stricken. 
Whether they were or not, since the motion for a 
new trial was denied, it may be assumed they were 
not considered by the court." 
Subsequently, in State v. Priestley, 97 Utah 158, 91 
P. 2d 443, affidavits were filed by each of eight jurors to 
the effect that they could not agree on the verdict of guilt 
or innocence and, therefore, compromised by finding the 
defendant guilty but recommended leniency. This court, 
in rejecting the appellant's contention that he should have 
granted a new trial, stated: 
"It is the settled law in this jurisdiction that 
jurors cannot impeach their verdict except in the 
instances expressly made exceptions by legislative 
enactment. People v. Flynn, 7 Utah 378, 26 P. 1114; 
People v. Ritchie, 12 Utah 180, 42 P. 209; State v. 
Rosenberg, 84 Utah 402, 35 P. 2d 1004. Section 
105-39-3, R. S. Utah 1933, Subdivision ( 4) provides 
that when a verdict has been determined by lot or 
by any means other than a fair expression of opin-
ion on the part of all the jurors the court may grant 
a new trial. The verdict in this case is termed by 
counsel for appellant a 'compromise verdict.' This 
is not a 'chance verdict' nor is it a ground for a 
new trial." 
Most recently, in State v. Rivenburgh, 11 U. 2d 95, 
355 P. 2d 689, this court ruled and stated: 
"Defendant Rivenburgh submitted for our con-
sideration an affidavit of each of two jurors to the 
effect that if the record did not support the conclu-
sion of Dr. Clarke, the state's expert witness, then 
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these two jurors would not have voted for the ver-
dict. The conclusion of Dr. Clarke referred to in 
the affidavits stated in substance that the dosages 
of drugs taken by Rivenburgh did not impair his 
mental or physical faculties to the extent that he 
did not know what he was doing, or cause him to 
react in any abnormal manner. The general rule in 
this state is expressed in State v. Priestly, to the 
effect that jurors cannot impeach their verdict ex-
cept in instances expressly made exceptions by leg-
islative enactments. The assignment of error under 
discussion falls under subsection ( 6) Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, section 77-38-3, dealing with the 
subject of the verdict being contrary to the evi-
dence. This is not an exception that permits a juror 
to impeach his verdict. Even so, the affidavits are 
conditional, and can be of no avail to this defendant, 
where the record does bear out and justifies the 
verdict of murder in the first degree." 
Clearly, therefore, Utah precedence amply supports 
the proposition that jurors may not impeach their own 
verdicts. By the same token, it is improper to allow a third 
person by hearsay affidavit, reciting a hearsay statement 
of a juror made subsequent to trial, to impeach the jury's 
verdict. 
In Mooney v. State, 273 P. 2d 768 (Okla. 1954), coun-
sel for the defendant filed an affidavit, stating that a juror, 
during the deliberations of the jury, had stated informa-
tion which he had independent of the trial as to the price 
of certain candy bars, etc. In holding that the affidavit of 
counsel could not provide a basis for impeaching the jury's 
verdict, the Oklahoma court stated: 
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"It has been held that: 
'' 'Affidavits or oral testimony of jurors are 
inadmissible to impeach their verdict, and affidavits 
of the defendant, or any other person, of alleged 
misconduct of a juror, upon information derived 
from particular jurors, are inadmissible to impeach 
the verdict.' Brantley v. State, 15 Okl. Cr. 6, 175 
P. 51. 
"If jurors cannot impeach their own verdict, cer-
tainly defense counsel should not be permitted to 
do so on the basis of sheer hearsay. For all the 
above and foregoing reasons the judgment and 
sentence herein imposed is accordingly affirmed." 
In a recent Nevada case, Pinana v. State, 352 P. 2d 
8~4 (Nev. 1960), a motion for new trial was based on an 
affidavit of counsel for one of the defendants to the effect 
that the verdict had been decided by means other than a 
fair expression of opinion on the part of the jurors. The 
Nevada court rejected the contention that this provided 
a basis for relief on appeal, stating: 
''* * * These affidavits concerned on 1 y 
hearsay statements of Richard Haman, one of the 
jurors, and amounted to an indirect way of per-
mitting a juror to impeach his own verdict. The 
court properly held that they were entitled to no 
consideration. Priest v. Cafferata, 57 Nev. 153, 60 
P. 2d 220." 
On the basis of the above cases and the reasoning con-
tained in the opinions, it is clear that the trial court in 
this instance did not err in denying the appellant's motion 
for ne'v trial. The affidavit, as offered, was merely hear-
say upon hearsay and an attempt to impeach the jury's 
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verdict. There is no claim of merit to the appellant's argu-
ment that the trial court erred in denying his motion for 
new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The sole basis for the appellant's request for relief 
from the Supreme Court in this instance is based upon a 
faulty legal premise. The appellant is entitled to no relief 
and this court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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